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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the incidence of public education subsidies in Ghana. Since 
the late 1990s, Ghana’s government has increasingly recognised human capital as a 
cornerstone to alleviating poverty and income inequality, causing dramatic increases of 
government expenditures to the education sector. At the same time user fees have been 
introduced in higher education while basic education is being made progressively free. 
The question then is, whether these spending increases have been effective in reaching 
the poor and to what extent? What factors influence the poor’s participation in the public 
school system? We attempt to address these issues, employing the standard benefit 
incidence methods and the willingness-to-pay method using a nested multinomial logit 
model. The results give a clear evidence of progressivity with consistent ordering: pre- 
schooling and primary schooling are the most progressive, followed by secondary, and 
then tertiary. The poorest quintile gains 14.8% of total education benefits in 2005 
compared to the richest quintile benefit of 26.3%. Own price and income elasticities are 
higher for private schools than public schools and for secondary than basic schools.  
 
Keywords: Ghana, public education spending, progressivity, concentration curves, school 
choice, nested multinomial logit, elasticity, poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
Human capital development is widely recognized as an important requirement for 
achieving sustained economic growth and rising incomes, particularly in developing 
countries (World Bank 1995). Its role was critical in the outstanding economic 
transformation of Japan, Taiwan, Hong-Kong, South-Korea, and other fast-growing 
economies (Becker 1995). Empirical evidence suggests that each additional year of 
schooling is associated with a 6-10 percent increase in earnings in developing countries 
(Duflo 2001), providing further support for educational investment as an effective 
approach to poverty reduction both by encouraging economic growth and as a method of 
redistribution to the poor (Besley and Burgess 2003). 
In Ghana, the government has identified investments in human capital (education and 
health) as an important means of achieving broad-based growth resulting in effective 
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poverty reduction (GOG 2005, Canagajah and Ye 2001). 1  Thus, public education 
expenditures have increased consistently, reaching about 20 percent of total expenditures 
(about 5.0 percent of GDP) and 74.0 percent of social spending in 2005 (Osei et al. 
2007:10).2 The question then is, have those spending increases improved access to, and 
choice of public schools? What factors determine the choice of education services? Who 
then are the actual beneficiaries of subsidized education services?  
Two general approaches have been widely used to assess the welfare impact of public 
spending: (1) benefit incidence studies, and (2) behavioural approaches. Previous benefit 
incidence studies (Demery et al. 1995; Canagarajah and Ye 2001) suggest that, in Ghana, 
the poorest quintile received about 16 percent of total education subsidies in 1992. 
Relevant as these studies may still be, their data is nearly 20 years old, suggesting the 
value of some updated estimates.3 Besides, by assigning the same unit costs to all users of 
public services, the benefit incidence approach assumes that all users benefit equally 
from public services. Again, the benefits incidence method does not have behavioural 
foundations and therefore cannot be used for policy simulations. On the other hand, the 
behavioural approach—also called the willingness-to-pay (WTP) method—has often 
tended to gloss over the distributional implications of the demand estimates (Younger 
1999) and the expenditures financing those public services. 
Thus, we use a combination of benefit incidence and behavioural (willingness-to-pay) 
approaches to analyse the welfare impact of public education expenditures (Younger 
1999). We use a nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model to estimate the demand for 
education services and then use the compensating variations (CVs) derived from those 
estimates to value education services to households. The demand estimates also enable us 
to examine the factors influencing households’ utilization of these services and to 
conduct some policy simulations. We also conduct a marginal incidence analysis by 
comparing our results with Demery et al (1995) to see how education benefits have 
changed overtime.  
The data for this study are drawn from the latest round of the Ghana Living Standards 
Survey (GLSS5 2005/06). GLSS5 includes a sample of 8,687 households containing 
37,128 household members. The survey collected information on individual and 
households, as well as information on current education level and type of school, 
employment, income and consumption. Our sample includes all children who are 
attending school or who are “eligible” to attend school. The latter group includes all 
children of the appropriate age who have not yet graduated from the level of school under 
consideration. Public education expenditures as well as unit costs incurred at each 
education level were obtained from the Ministry of Education Science and Sports 
(MOESS).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview 
of the education sector in Ghana. The review of previous research is considered in section 
3 while section 4 explains the methodology and presents the results of the benefit 
                                                 
1 Human capital (education and health) has been identified as one of the four main pillars of GPRS II. Prior 
to this, the vision 2020 document has also paid priority attention to human capital (GOG 1997).  
2 Public social spending has increased consistently during the last decades, reaching over 23 percent of total 
government expenditures and over 57 percent of discretionary expenditures in 2005. 
3 This finding was based on 1992 GLSS 3 survey.  
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incidence of public education subsidies and school choice model. Section 5 presents the 
concluding remarks and policy implications. 
 
2. A brief overview of the education system  
Ghana’s education system—established initially to reflect a standard British-style 
education—was once regarded as one of the most developed in Western Africa (Demery 
et al 1995). The general economic decline of the early 1980s severely affected the 
education system and by the mid-1980s, the system was already in sharp decline. The 
education budget as a share of GNP had declined by 5.0 percentage points between 1975 
and 1983 (6.4 percent to 1.4 percent) with primary education spending per capita falling 
by 61 percent over the same period (Demery et al 1995). Besides budgetary issues, the 
education system also suffered from acute shortage of educational materials including 
teachers, textbooks, and instructional materials throughout the country’s schools 
(Akyeampong et al 2007). The problem was exacerbated by poor conditions of service 
(low salaries) which caused the exodus of trained teachers for greener pastures elsewhere, 
particularly to Nigeria, where the oil boom has increased the demand for professionals 
including teachers.  
Against this background, a radical educational reform was launched in 1987 as part of 
the overall economic reform program (ERP), which sought, among others, to expand and 
create a more equitable access at all levels of education; to change the structure of the 
school system, reducing the length of pre-tertiary education from 17 to 12 years while 
increasing contact hours between teachers and pupils. 4 The deteriorations that 
characterized the sector in the 1970s were halted while the infrastructure base was 
improved. The number of basic schools also witnessed a significant increase—rising 
from 12,997 in 1980 to 18,374 in 2000—while attendance and completion rates improved 
(Akyeampong et al., 2007). Total government expenditure on education had more than 
doubled under the ERP, moving from 1.4 percent of GDP in 1983 to 3.8 percent in 1992 
(Demery et al 1995). Total education expenditures (actual) both as a share of the national 
discretionary budget and GDP have also increased consistently reaching 31.0 percent and 
6.0 percent respectively in 2006 (MOES 2008);  the lion’s share going to basic education.  
Financing education has remained central in Ghana’s education policy.5  Rate of 
return studies have shown that in Sub-Saharan Africa, both the social and private rate of 
return are highest in primary education and lowest in higher education (Psacharopoulos 
[1994]; World Bank [1995]). At the same time, benefit incidence studies have shown that 
public expenditures on primary education are welfare improving compared to those on 
higher education. The implication of these findings is straight forward: 1) cut subsidies to 
higher education and introduce cost recovery through user fees, 2) raise subsidies to basic 
education and abolish tuition fees. In the mid-1990s and consistent with the above policy 
implications, Ghana’s education system witnessed two main policy reforms: cost 
recovery measures were introduced in higher education to be achieved through increased 
school fees, facilities user fees, and withdrawal of subsidies while ‘free and compulsory 
                                                 
4 The reforms have replaced the four-year middle schools with a three-year junior secondary, and reduces 
senior secondary from 7 years—5 years ordinary level and 2 years advanced level—to 3 years. Primary and 
junior secondary have become basic education. 
5  The central government remains the main financier of education, contributing about 82.0 percent 
(including the GETFUND) of total education spending between 2003 and 2008. 
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universal basic education’ (FCUBE) was introduced in basic education (to be achieved by 
2005).  
The cost recovery measure was initially opposed by tertiary education students with 
demonstrations and disruption of academic calendars, forcing fees to remain consistently 
low with little upward adjustments. The new policy is to allow qualified applicants who 
do not get a place in the regular admission but can afford the full fees to enrol. The 
FCUBE initially covered only the tuition fee. However, the cost of sending a child to 
school goes far beyond tuition. Other costs such as cost of uniform, books, travel, tariffs 
for structural works, parent’ teacher association fees—used as supplements to the 
government subsidies to the schools (Canagarajah and Ye 2001)—all impose substantial 
burden on households (Aryeetey and Goldstein, 2000). The program led to steady but 
slower increase in school enrolments, yet failed to reduce the opportunity cost of 
schooling to households (Akyeampong 2009). In order to make the FCUBE fully 
operational, the government, in 2005, initiated the capitation grant concept, abolishing 
fees being charged in basic schools by providing each school with a little grant for each 
child enrolled.6  The school lunch and the free uniform programmes have also been 
launched.  
The recent proliferation of private universities also marked a significant feature of the 
reforms. These institutions, mainly religious based, offer a limited number of professional 
courses—accountancy, marketing, economics, banking and finance, and computer 
science—tailored towards the labour market. They target mainly working class students 
and run programmes in the evenings and on part-time bases, employing mostly part-time 
teachers. They derived revenue from tuition and boarding fees (Larocque 2001). The 
traditional universities have come under constant attacks from employers in recent years 
for failing to produce graduates that meet the changing labour market standards. Thus, 
the emergence of the private institutions should be seen as a welcome development since 
they are more focused on the job market requirements than just providing a general 
education.  
 
3. Public spending, education and poverty 
The impact of public spending on educational outcome has been a major subject of 
research for years, with mixed results. The general consensus is that public spending 
alone is insufficient for achieving improved educational outcomes of the poor. The issue 
of targeting is equally important (Martinez-Vazquez 2001). Meanwhile, Yuki (2003) has 
compiled studies that examined the incidence of public spending on education in a cross-
section of developing countries. For those that focus on Africa, the poorest quintile shares 
in total education subsidies were 16.4% in Ghana in 1992 (21.8% primary, 14.9% 
secondary, 6.0% tertiary), 19.9% in South Africa in 1993 (25.8% primary, 18.8% 
secondary, 6.1% higher), 19.4% in Cote d’Ivoire in 1995 (28.8% primary, 11.2% 
secondary), 17.0% in Kenya in 1992 (21.8% primary, 6.4% secondary, 2.0% higher), 
16.0% in Malawi in 1995 (20.0% primary, 9.0% secondary, 1.0% higher), 13.0% in 
Tanzania in 1994 (20.0% primary, 7.6% secondary, 0.0% higher), 8.3% in Madagascar in 
                                                 
6 The programme was first piloted in 40 most deprived districts in 2004. Gross enrolment shot up by 14.5 
percent while that of pre-school was 38 percent. Given its success, the programme was adopted nationally 
in 2005, which offers GH¢2.5 per boy child and GH¢3.5 per girl child to cover school fees and levies such 
as cultural dues, sports dues, and development levies.    
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1994 (17.2% primary, 2.0% secondary, 0.0% higher). In all these countries, the poor 
gains a disproportionately higher proportion of primary schools subsidies while subsidies 
to higher education accrue mainly to the wealthy.  
More specific evidence can be found in Glick and Razakamanantsoa (2005) who find 
in Madagascar that primary and secondary education are more equally distributed than 
consumption expenditures. University enrolments are however, concentrated among the 
wealthy than consumption. Primary schooling was found to be per capita progressive 
while secondary and university schooling were found to be per capita regressive—they 
accrue disproportionately to the well off. Younger (1999) also uses a combination of 
benefit incidence and behavioural approaches to assess the relative progressivity of 
public services in Ecuador in 1994 and finds that primary education is the most 
progressive, followed by secondary education, public universities and then private 
universities. He actually compared three different versions of the benefit incidence 
method: standard (with unit cost which varies by region), uniform (binary indicator: one 
if a service is used and zero otherwise), and compensating variation-based and concludes 
that the three methods yield similar results in terms of the ranking of public services with 
consistent ordering. In a related study in Peru in 1998, Younger (2000) finds that, 
spending on primary education is the most progressive, followed by secondary schooling, 
then post-secondary. He also observed that though social spending is likely to have an 
equalizing redistributional effect, its overall impact on poverty was only marginal. Glick 
and Sahn (2006) find in Madagascar that fee increases reduce public and total (public 
plus private) primary enrolment proportionately much more for the poor than the well-off, 
making the distribution of schooling less equitable. They also find that improvement in 
public school quality tends to benefit the poor disproportionately. 
 
4. Estimation 
4.1 Benefit incidence and welfare dominance 
Benefit incidence has become a fairly standard first line method of assessing the 
impact of public expenditures. One key issue is the degree of progressivity in benefits, 
usually depicted via concentration curves. The concentration curve is a normative tool 
similar to the Lorenz curve, and plots the cumulative shares of individuals in the 
population, ranked by household expenditure per capita/per equivalent adults on the x-
axis and the cumulative shares of benefits on the y-axis. However, unlike the Lorenz 
curve, which represents the cumulative percentage of total income held by a cumulative 
proportion of the population (after ordering income in increasing magnitude), a 
concentration curve can lie above the diagonal—the poorest 40% of the population 
cannot earn more than 40% of total income, but they can receive more than 40% of total 
benefits from public spending (Hakro and Akram [2007]).  
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Source: Hakro and Akram (2007) 
  Figure 1: Lorenz and Concentration Curves 
 
Two measures of progressivity can be defined (Younger et al., 1999; Glick and 
Razakamanantsoa, 2005). ‘Expenditure progressivity’, or simply progressivity, involves 
comparing the distribution of the benefit to the distribution of welfare (expenditures). If 
the benefit concentration curve dominates the expenditure Lorenz curve—that is, if it is at 
all points above the curve for household expenditures—then the benefit is said to be 
progressive. Such a benefit would more likely redistribute the resources even if funded 
by proportional taxes, and the poorer are comparatively better off when considering 
both their income and public spending, compared to considering only their income 
(Hakro and Akram [2007]). 
The second measure is called ‘per capita progressivity’ following Sahn and Younger 
(2000). This compares the distribution of the benefit to the distribution of the population 
rather than expenditures. Here, a benefit is said to be per capita progressive (pro-poor) if 
the benefit curve lies everywhere above (dominates) the 45 degree line. Benefits whose 
concentration curves lie everywhere above the diagonal show that poorer households 
receive disproportionately large shares of the benefit. This measure is relatively stricter 
but insures that, for any definition of the poverty line, the poor receive a disproportionate 
share of the benefit. Concentration curves that lie below the Lorenz curve are classified 
as regressive—the benefit accrues disproportionately to the wealthy.  
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It is also possible to rank different services according to their progressivity. For 
example, a given subsidy is said to dominate another if its concentration curve is 
everywhere above the concentration curve for the other. The concentration coefficient, 
which is calculated in the same fashion as the GINI coefficient, estimates the inequalities 
in the distribution of government expenditures. The difference however, is that the 
concentration coefficient is calculated by keeping the income group the same (Hakro and 
Akram [2007]). The concentration coefficient can lie in range of -1 and 1 while the GINI 
coefficient lies between 0 and 1. If the concentration coefficient is lower than the GINI 
coefficient, it shows that expenditures are more evenly distributed than income and vice 
versa.  
 
The distribution of education benefits for the poor 
We begin by estimating the incidence of public education expenditures for all levels 
of education (primary, secondary and post-secondary). Note that benefit incidence and 
progressivity analyses refer to public services only. Subsidies refer to recurrent 
expenditures on each level of education. Figure 2 presents the concentration curves for 
the various education services considered. Each graph shows two concentrations 
curves—distribution of children and the benefit concentration curves. We first evaluate 
these curves against our benchmarks of Lorenz curve (household consumption 
expenditure) and the perfect equality line (45-degree line). One can easily tell which of 
these services is progressive. The fact that the concentration curves for children dominate 
the 45-degree line indicates that there are more children in the poorest quintile than in the 
richest quintile. For instance, 20.8 percent of school-age children (3 – 23 years) are found 
in the poorest quintile (25.5 percent for poorer households) compared to about 17.9 
percent for the richest quintile (13.0 percent for richer households), thus showing that 
poorer households tend to have more children. 
From figure 2, all education services dominate the Lorenz curve with the exception of 
tertiary education, indicating that pre-tertiary education services are progressive. Their 
concentration coefficients are much smaller than the GINI coefficient (Table 3). The 
poorest quintile’s share of total education spending (14.8 percent) is significantly higher 
than their share of household expenditures (5.1 percent), indicating that public education 
spending is more equitably distributed than household expenditures (Table 2). The richest 
quintile however received 26.3 percent of total benefits; higher than its distribution of 
children but much less than its share of total household expenditures. This trend is 
consistent at all education levels except post-secondary whose benefits to the poorest 
quintile are much less than their share of income. The curves become sharply more 
convex with increase in the level of education. For instance, the poorest quintile’s share 
of education benefits declines from about 20 percent for pre-school to 4.0 percent for 
tertiary education while the richest quintile’s share of the benefits increases from 14.6 
percent for pre-school to 50.3 percent for post-secondary respectively (Table 2).  
Primary (and pre-schooling) schooling benefits are more concentrated among the 
poorest quintile with the bottom two quintiles receiving a cumulative share of about 41 
percent, indicating that primary education subsidies are definitely progressive. The 
poorest quintile’s rate of participation in public primary is higher than that of the richest 
quintile (79 percent against 70.0 percent) mainly because a large proportion of children in 
the richest quintile are enrolled in private primary. Secondary and tertiary schooling are 
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all dominated by the 450 line, hence are said to be per capita regressive. Benefits from 
these services accrue more disproportionately to the well-off households; hence are 
poorly targeted. Senior high (including TVET) is progressive in terms of household 
expenditures with the poorest quintile receiving 15.5 percent of the benefits of this level 
compared to 26.3 percent for the richest quintile. 7  Post-secondary (universities, 
polytechnics, and teacher education) education is regressive in absolute terms (both in 
terms of household expenditures and the 450 line) with the richest quintile appropriating 
50.3 percent of the benefits (Table 2). Though subsidies to teacher education are more 
equally distributed than those to universities and polytechnics, its contribution seems too 
small to affect the overall progressivity of post-secondary subsidies.  
 
Distribution across Households and Differences by Gender and Locality  
The above results assessed across individuals show that the distribution of public 
education benefits does not favour the poor in absolute terms. For instance, while the 
poorest quintile received 14.8 percent of total benefits, the richest quintile has 
appropriated 26.3 percent of the benefits. Assessing the distribution across households 
however gives a different picture in favour of poorer households. For instance, the 
poorest households received 20.3 percent of total subsidies while the richest households 
gained 14.9 percent of the benefits, showing a concentration of benefits in poorer 
households. The poorest households gain more in basic schooling while benefits from 
post-basic education accrue disproportionately to richer households (Table 2). This gain 
to poorer households however, falls short of the distribution of its school-age population 
(25.5 percent for poorest households and 13.2 percent for richest households).  
The distribution of benefits also varies by geography (rural/urban) and gender. Rural 
areas received a disproportionate share of public education benefits, capturing 59.2 
percent of total education subsidies in 2005, which decreases with an increase in the level 
of education (Table 2). The bulk of basic education benefits accrue disproportionately to 
rural areas, which received 76.8 percent and 68.0 percent of primary and junior high 
subsidies respectively (Table 2). As for senior high and tertiary education, urban areas 
have received the lion’s share (58.4 and 74.4 percent respectively). 
With regards to gender, males received slightly higher education benefits (51.7 
percent) than women (48.3 percent) with much disparity coming from secondary (Table 
5). There was almost equal distribution of benefits between males and females for post-
secondary, mainly because of teacher education which tend to enrol more female students.  
Our next task is to evaluate these services against each other—relative progressivity 
(Younger 1999). A casual observation of these curves can tell us which services are more 
progressive. Primary (and pre-school) services are the most progressive since their 
concentration curves dominate those of all other services, followed by secondary, which 
in turn is more progressive than post-secondary; a pattern that has become standard for 
developing countries (Glick and Razakamanantsoa 2005). 8  The analysis of school 
                                                 
7 Junior high and senior high (including TVET) all dominate the Lorenz curve of household expenditures. 
Junior high crosses the 45-degree line—the poorest quintile captured 16.2 percent of subsidies to this level 
compared to 18.9 percent for the richest quintile. For this service, all quintiles received higher benefits than 
the richest quintile, with the exception of the bottom quintile. 
8 More pointedly, primary is the most progressive, followed by JHS, SHS/TVET, and then post-secondary. 
Subsidies to TVET/TTC dominate those of SHS. The poorest quintile’s share of post-secondary benefits 
was only about 4.0 percent. 
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enrolment rates shows that a number of children in poorest households tend to terminate 
their schooling at primary level, and some at JHS. Thus, the widening gap between 
primary and secondary education is a reflection of this trend.  
 
Changes in the incidence of education subsidies: 1989 – 2005 
How has the incidence of public education spending changed over time? Has 
targeting improved over the years? Here we consider the change in the benefit incidence 
of public education spending by comparing the results to Demery et al. (1995). These 
studies are actually comparable because the databases are similar. The study of Demery 
at al. (1995) is based on the GLSS 2 (1989) and 3 (1992) while the present study is based 
on GLSS 5 (2005/06), all of which are nationally representative household surveys 
conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). For the sake of this comparison, we 
group pre-school and primary into primary education; JHS, SHS, and TVET are grouped 
into secondary, while universities, polytechnics, and teacher education are grouped into 
post-secondary. After basic school (JHS), children can either enroll in SHS or TVET. 
However, SHS is required for tertiary (university and polytechnic) and teacher training.  
For 2005, the benefit to secondary is a weighted average of JHS and SHS (including 
TVET). Table 5 reports the changes in distribution of education benefits between 1989 
and 2005. The poorest quintile remains the smallest beneficiary of total education 
benefits, showing a declining share of total benefits between 1989 and 2005. For instance, 
the share of total benefits accruing to the poorest quintile has declined by 2.3 percentage 
points; falling from 17.1 percent in 1989 to 14.8 percent in 2005. It declined by 0.7 
percentage point between 1989 and 1992, and further by 2.6 percentage points between 
1992 and 2005. The bottom two quintiles accounted for an accumulated share of 32.3 
percent of total benefits in 2005 compared with their cumulative income share of about 
16 percent. The richest quintile however, appropriated 26.3 percent of total education 
benefits in 2005, gaining by 5.5 percentage points between 1992 and 2005 and 2.6 
percentage points over the period 1989-2005 (Table 5). The bottom two quintiles 
witnessed a decrease in primary education benefits over the period 1992 and 2005, with 
benefits decreasing by 3.4 and 1.4 percent respectively over this period.  
After primary education, benefits accrue disproportionately to the richest quintile. For 
instance, the poorest quintile received 14.9 percent of secondary9 education benefits in 
1992 and 16.0 percent in 2005, indicating an increase of 1.1 percentage points. The 
richest quintile on the other hand has gained by 6.3 percentage points over this period 
(rising from 18.6 percent in 1992 to 24.9 percent in 2005). The poorest quintile continues 
to make a generally poor showing in tertiary education compared with the richest quintile 
(4.0 percent against 50.3 percent). Between 1992 and 2005, the poorest quintile’s share of 
tertiary education benefits has declined by 2.0 percentage points while the richest 
quintile’s share has increased by 5.1 percentage points (Table 5).10 
The share of rural areas in total education subsidies has increased by 1.3 percentage 
points between 1992 and 2005, with its share of the total benefits remaining consistently 
high (58.7, 57.9, and 59.2 percent in 1989, 1992, and 2005 respectively). In terms of 
education levels, rural areas received 77.1 percent of primary education subsidies in 2005 
                                                 
9 For 2005, the benefit to secondary is a weighted average of JHS and SHS (including TVET). 
10 Ranking in terms of expenditure per capita, the change in tertiary benefits for the richest quintile was 21 
percentage points as against a decline of 5.5 percentage points for the poorest quintile.  
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(rising by 7.0 percentage points from 70.1 percent in 1992). It also received 60.2 and 25.6 
percent of secondary and post-secondary subsidies respectively in 2005. Accra’s share of 
primary education benefits have decreased consistently between 1989 and 2005, with its 
share in total education subsidies dropping by 5.6 percentage points over this period 
(Table 5).    
 
4.2 School choice model 
The benefit incidence analysis presented above lacks behavioural foundation, hence 
cannot be used for policy simulation. In this section we derive and present results on a 
school choice model that enables us to understand behavioural responses to public 
spending. Following previous authors (Gertler, Locay and Sanderson 1987; Gertler and 
Glewwe 1990; Younger 1999; and Glick and Sahn 2001), we assume that households 
derive utility from the human capital of children, which depends on schooling and on the 
consumption of all other goods (net income). Confronted with the decision to enrol in 
public school, private school, and non-enrolment, parents choose the option that yields 
the highest utility. Schooling raises the human capital, a kind of asset to parents which is 
achieved at the cost of school fees and reduced consumption of other goods. An 
individual will only choose the non-enrolment/no-school option only if it yields utility 
higher than all other alternatives. For each option (say option j), the indirect utility 
associated with choosing that option depends on the following simple linear 
specification: 
ijijijiij eSβPYcV  1)(     (1) 
Where, c(Y-Pj) is net household income (proxied by household expenditure, Y) less 
school cost at option j (Pij), which includes both the direct and the indirect (opportunity) 
costs. Finally, ej is a noise term specific to the household and unobserved by the 
researcher, which can be correlated across options within a branch. The function Sij, 
which represents the increase in human capital, is expected to vary across options since 
the quality of the alternatives may differ. For the non-enrolment option, Sij is normalized 
to zero based on the assumption that the individual gains no utility from not attending 
school. Since the change cannot be directly observed, β1Sij is replaced by a reduced form 
equation for the utility from human capital as follows: 
ijijjij nXδQγSβ 1                                             (2) 
 Where Qj is a vector of school quality variables and Xi is a vector of observed household 
and individual characteristics. This is what Glick and Sahn (2001) referred to as 
representing a production function of human capital in which both school and household 
variables are inputs. Substituting (3.4) into (3.3) yields 
ijijjijiij εXδQγPYcV  )(                                  (3) 
Where, εij=eij + nij and δj, the coefficient on household and individual characteristics are 
allowed to be constant across alternatives. We assume the function, Sij to be linear while 
net income   is assumed to be logarithmic  - i.e. )log()( ijiiji PYαPYc  .
11  
                                                 
11 An issue is the functional form for net income, c (Yi - Pj), for which there is no consensus in the literature. 
Previous authors have used various specifications: linear (Akin 1985; Dor and van der Gaag 1993); 
quadratic (Gertler and van der Gaag 1990; Gertler and Glewwe 1990); logarithmic Younger (1999; 2000). 
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The specification used in this study is a NMNL model with three options for 
school choice considered—no-school/non-enrolment, public, or private. The NMNL 
model allows us to relax the homoscedasticity (independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA)) assumption of a potential conditional logit model. 12 In this framework, since the 
decision to choose a particular provider is a discrete choice problem, the determination of 
demand involves estimating the probability that a particular service provider—public or 
private—will be chosen. In this model, two of the options are in one nest while the other 
option (with utility normalized to zero) is in the second nest. Thus, the probability that a 
person chooses provider j is given as (3.6):  






 




 








k
k
k
kj
j
V
VV
exp1
expexp
1
, k=j,i      (4) 
As we noted, the cost of schooling (Pj) includes both the direct and the indirect 
(opportunity) cost. The GLSS 5 survey which forms the database for this study defines 
the direct cost as the sum of registration and tuition fee, cost of uniforms, cost of books, 
transport cost, parent teacher association dues, feeding and boarding, and expenses on 
extra classes. Opportunity cost measures the cost of the time needed to stay in school 
(Younger 1999), and it is calculated for children aged 10 or older as the time spent at 
school (6 hours) plus travel time multiplied by a predicted wage estimated from a simple 
OLS wage function (Table A.1). For children below this age, we assume a zero 
opportunity cost.  
For the options not chosen, because we do not have figures for direct costs and travel 
time, we estimate them using the median observed cost for the child’s region, area 
(rural/urban), and type of school (public/private). The use of median scores is to avoid the 
extreme values bias often associated with mean scores. For the no-school option, the net 
income is just the gross income..  
The national survey does not contain quality information; hence the Sij is simply a 
function of household and individual characteristics plus an option specific dummy. By 
leaving out important quality variables that probably correlate with net income and with 
the probability of choosing a particular provider could mean that we are overestimating 
elasticity estimates which could tend to underestimate the incidence of the education 
services (Younger 1999). However, in Younger (1999) this omitted variable does not 
affect the progressivity of services.  
We considered three samples for our demand function estimations: pre-school, 
primary, and secondary. We did not include tertiary education in the demand function 
estimates for two reasons: rationing of tertiary education and the share of the private 
sector was too small. Our sample includes all children who are attending school or who 
are “eligible” to attend school. The latter group includes all children of the appropriate 
age who have not yet graduated from the level of school under consideration. We follow 
the standard practice and include all children of an appropriate age who have already 
graduated from the previous level (at least 3 for pre-school, at least 6 for primary, at least 
                                                 
12 The nested logit reduces to the conditional logit if the two dissimilarity parameters are both equal to 1 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
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15 for secondary, at least 18 for tertiary). In order to account for late entry and overage 
attendance—a typical phenomenon in Ghana—we truncate the sample at a maximum age 
(8 for pre-school, 14 for primary, and 21 for secondary).13 Given that those who have 
already graduated from the current level do not have demand for that level, we omit 
children of an appropriate age who have already graduated this level. Each model 
includes similar regressors of age, gender, relationship with head of household, net 
income, years completed at the current level, head’s education and age, a dummy of 
household composition (number of men, number of women, number of children) while 
controlling for religion, area of residence, and sector of employment (Table A.3).  
Table 6 presents the means and standard deviations of these variables. From the Table, 
net household expenditure differs from gross expenditure by the total school cost. The 
indirect cost (opportunity cost) constitutes the lion’s share of total cost, representing 55 
percent of total school cost in both primary and secondary samples. These costs are 
slightly higher for private providers than the public provider. The means of net income 
and their standard deviations were ¢17.9 million and ¢15.9 million respectively for the 
pre-school sample, 20.1 and 19.7 for the primary sample, 23.4 and 26.4 respectively for 
secondary sample (GLSS 5). These figures also vary across options. For instance, within 
the pre-school sample, mean net income is 14.7 for the no-school option, 18.1 for the 
public school option, and 28.1 for the private school option. The mean ages for the 
various samples are 4.9 for pre-school, 9.5 for primary, and 18.1 for secondary. Females 
constitute more than 48.0 percent of each sample. Majority of households (over 70.0 
percent) dwell in rural areas with over 20 percent headed by women (Table 6).  
 
Econometrics results 
Table 7 presents estimates of the NMNL model of school choice for pre-school, 
primary, and secondary schooling. For each model, the Wald tests reject the null of all 
coefficients being zero and the null of equality of coefficients across the public and 
private options. Due to the nature of our nested structure, we have to constrain the no-
school option to unity; hence its dissimilarity parameter is 1. The dissimilarity parameters, 
σ (0.88 for pre-primary, 0.26 for primary, and 0.24 for secondary) are between zero and 
one, indicating that our model is consistent with the additive random utility maximization. 
The LR tests, τ rejects the IIA assumption and give strong support for the NMNL instead 
of a MNL model.  
The coefficient for net income, the variable of interest is positive and significant in all 
equations. As for the child’s characteristics, we find that age increases the probability of 
enrolling in both pre-school and primary school (both public and private) but turns 
negative for secondary. Being the child of the household’s head positively and significant 
increases the probability of enrolments, both public and private. Despites the slight 
gender difference in school attendance reported earlier, the gender indicator (=1 if 
female) is not statistically significant at any conventional significant levels, except in the 
secondary equation where females have a lower probability of enrolment. The number of 
years previously completed at the current level has a positive and significant effect on the 
                                                 
13 For secondary school, some authors include even children of secondary age who have not yet graduated 
from primary school (Younger 1999). Secondary includes only senior high.  
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probability of enrolment at all levels.14  Years of schooling of the household’s head 
positively and significantly increases the probability of a child’s school attendance both 
across samples and equations, with the exception of the secondary model. 
The age of the household head is not significant at all conventional significant levels, 
with the exception of the public pre-school equation. A female headed household has a 
higher probability of enrolment in all models, exception secondary. Number of men, 
number of women, and number of children negatively and significantly decrease the 
probability of private pre-school enrolments at 1.0 percent significant level. They are 
insignificant in both primary and secondary equations. We also controlled for regional 
and religious differences, as well as the sector of employment of the head of the 
household; only significant variables are reported (Table 7). 
 
Valuation based on the compensating variation 
The analyses presented in section 4.1 are based on the standard benefit incidence 
(unit-cost) approach which is often criticised for its arbitrary valuation of public 
services.15  The alternative is to use measures benefits estimated from the school choice 
model. Compensating variation (CV) is that amount of money that when subtracted from 
the individual’s income in the new state (1) makes utility in the new state, with the 
subtraction, equal to utility in the original state (0). That is,  
 
0011
jijjjijijjji εXδQγCVPYcεXδQγPYcV  )()(               (9) 
where, P0 is price in the original state, P1 is price in the new state etc.  In the method 
developed by Morey and Rossman (2007), it is supposed that the household-specific 
epsilon terms are the same in both states and therefore cancel by assumption. We use the 
NMNL estimates presented above to calculate CV for public schooling, which we then 
used to assess the benefits of public schooling to households.  
Specifically, for a household where public schooling is the best option and private 
schooling provides the second highest level of utility, CV is defined implicitly by the 
following equation,   
 
)()( 1
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
                                      (10) 
where Vpublic and Vprivate are the estimated utilities associated with public and private 
options respectively, α is the coefficient of net income.  In the case where the second best 
                                                 
14 This is what Younger (1999) called the “sheepskin effect”, which shows the fact that: 1) returns to 
schooling is not simply the accumulation of human capital (which suffers from diminishing marginal 
return); rather it signals achievement by the completion of a level and the reward of a particular degree; 2) 
one is more likely to attend a good school for several years than a bad one, reflecting the unobserved 
quality differences in schools. 
15 For instance, by assigning the same unit cost to all observed users, the standard approach is assuming that 
all households benefits equally from public services. In practice however, children from poorer households 
are more likely to attend poorer quality schools compared to children from wealthier homes.  
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option for a household is no schooling then we replace Vprivate by 0. Where the best option 
is either no schooling or private schooling, then CV = 0.  
 Figure 3 compares the three different methods—standard, uniform, and the CV-based 
methods—while the dominance tests are reported in Table 10. For the services 
considered, our finding agrees largely with Younger (1999) that the method of valuation 
does not affect the ranking of social services. Services that are (per capita or expenditure) 
progressive with one method is in most cases so with other methods.What is however 
unclear, is the order of progressivity. For both pre-school and primary schooling, the 
standard method is obviously the most progressive, followed by the uniform and then the 
compensating variation. For secondary schooling (only senior high) however, the test 
could not confirm dominance of any one method over another (Table 10). 
 
 
The elasticity of demand 
The coefficients of the NMNL estimates can be difficult to interpret, thus we 
explore the influence of price and income variables by the analysis of elasticities. If we 
let pj to represent the price for provider j, which by assumption only enters utility of 
option j (Vj), then it follows that  
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Hence, the own elasticity, 
 















 
k
k
j
j
j
j
j
jj V
V
p
p
V

 exp
exp1
1       (6) 
Note that this equals the standard formula for multinomial logit when sigma is 1. Note 
also that 
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α   where, α is the coefficient on net 
household expenditure.  
 
The elasticity estimates: Table 8 reports price and income elasticities of demand 
calculated at mean levels for each schooling option by expenditure quintile. As would be 
expected, the price elasticities are consistently negative in all equations and options. For 
all income quintiles, the elasticities are significantly higher (in absolute terms) for private 
providers than the public provider. Demand for schooling becomes more elastic as one 
move from primary to secondary. For instance, a 1.0 percent increase in direct cost of 
schooling (including tuition, textbooks and supplies) would result in a reduction in 
demand for public pre-schools by 0.033 percent among the poorest quintile as compared 
to 0.043 percent in private pre-school, other factors being constant. A similar pattern is 
observed for primary and secondary schooling, though with higher elasticities (Table 8). 
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All income elasticities also have the expected positive sign, with the lower 
income groups exhibiting higher price and income elasticities. That is, demand for 
schooling among the lowest income individuals is substantially more price and income 
elastic than among the richest group. This suggests that income, proxied by household 
expenditure is a crucial determinant of school enrolment and school choice. A one 
percent increase in income would lead to about 0.125 percentage point increase in the 
demand for private secondary schools as compared with 0.05 percentage point increase in 
public secondary schools among the poorest income group (Table 8).  
 
Policy simulation: We complement the above elasticities of demand by carrying out a 
number of policy simulations. Making education, especially public education more 
accessible to the people may involve one or more of the following: 1) making public 
schools free, 2) offering subsidies that make private schools free, and 3) increasing the 
income of poorer households. We do not have information to calculate the relative cost of 
these policies but at least we can simulate the impact of each in a simple way. The 
procedure followed here is, first, we set public provider’s price to zero and simulate the 
change in predicted probability on both the three options (no-school, private and public). 
Second, we set private providers’ price to zero. Third, we increase the income of the 
poorest households (details below) and simulate its effect on predicted probability. These 
predicted probabilities are then compared with the predicted probabilities for our baseline 
model.  
Table 9 reports the results of the simulations for the three samples (pre-school, 
primary, and secondary respectively). From the baseline model (when all variables are at 
their actual values), we find that, 32.2 percent of the pre-school sample, 62.5 percent of 
the primary sample, and 21.4 percent of the secondary sample will choose public school. 
A larger proportion however (48.2, 19.8, and 74.6 percent respectively) will stay out of 
school (Table 9). When we set the public provider’s price to zero, we find that, the 
probability of attending public schools rose to 51.5, 73.1, and 26.5 percent for pre-school, 
primary, and secondary schools respectively, while the probability of choosing the 
private option declines significantly, indicating a substitution into public option. Making 
private provider’s price equal to zero also resulted in a massive substitution into private 
schooling (Table 9), but compared to the first simulation has a smaller impact on the 
probability of not attending a school. 
The fact that non-enrolment is still high even after setting prices to zero is a reflection 
of the negative effect of high opportunity costs on schooling demand. Akyeampong 
(2009) highlighted the inability of the FCUBE to reduce the indirect cost of schooling as 
a major issue with the programme.  
In our next simulation, we move all households in the poorest quintile into the second 
quintile, and then move all poor households to the upper poverty line set by the Ghana 
Statistical Service (GSS 2007). We find no drastic change in probabilities. The marginal 
changes in the probabilities due to changes in income of the poorest households are 
however, consistent with the low income elasticities (not reported). This could be 
suggesting that merely moving households to the poverty line is not particularly effective 
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in increasing attendance; income must be raised well above the poverty line in order to 
make significant impacts on school attendance.16    
 
 
5 Conclusion and policy implications  
In this paper, we have presented a description of the distribution of public education 
expenditures, coverage, utilization as well as the benefit incidence of public education 
spending in Ghana, considering all levels of education—pre-schooling, primary, 
secondary, and tertiary. We find that the education system, particularly public education 
is generally progressive—benefits are more equally distributed than household 
expenditures but not in absolute terms. The poorest quintile received 14.8 percent of total 
education subsidies in 2005, greater than its share of household expenditures. In relative 
terms, primary schooling is the most progressive, followed by secondary, then post-
secondary; an ordering that has become standard for developing countries. Secondary 
education is also fairly progressive (relative to household expenditure but not in absolute 
terms) while tertiary education is regressive in absolute terms (both in terms of the 
Lorenz curve and the 450 line). A high proportion of school-age children are terminating 
their schooling at primary and many more at junior high. 
The demand estimates show that price and income are important determinants of 
school enrolments. The fact that the poor’s demand for schooling is more price-elastic 
than the wealthy suggests that price increases for public schooling will have negative 
implications for equity. Increases in cost will result in a larger than proportionate 
reduction in demand among the poor compared with the wealthy, making the distribution 
of public primary school benefits less progressive. From our policy simulations, though 
setting prices to zero led to dramatic increases in school enrolment, the high probability 
of non-attendance reflects the high opportunity cost to schooling.  
Our finding suggests that: 1) a basic education subsidy applied uniformly across the 
income distribution will disproportionately benefit the schooling of poor children; 2) if 
the government gave all households an annual income transfer, rather than subsidized 
education, income expenditure distribution would improve, other things being constant; 
3) and because we considered average instead of marginal incidence, we can cautiously 
say that, an additional cedi spent on basic education would more likely improve equity 
than an additional cedi spent on secondary and tertiary education, if both are spent in the 
same way as the current budget so that neither the beneficiaries nor their share of the 
benefits change.  
                                                 
16 A similar trend was observed by moving everybody out of the poorest quintile, which involves awarding 
the minimum income in the 2nd quintile to all households in the poorest quintile. 
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Table 1: Public school enrolments, recurrent expenditure, and unit cost, 2005 
Level Enrolment   Recurrent exp  Unit costsa 
      GH¢  GH¢ US$ % GNI per capita
Preschool 866,678  23,282,600 26.9 24.4 5.2 
Primary 2,727,044  176,628,700 64.8 59.0 12.6 
JHS 951,673  118,188,095 124.2 113.0 24.2 
SHS 367,242  122,687,132 334.1 304.0 65.0 
TVET 20,303  5,339,437 263.0 239.3 51.2 
Teacher 8,965  25,543,000 2,849.2 2,592.8 554.4 
Tertiary 111,893   118,353,536  1,057.7 962.5 205.8 
 Source: Preliminary Education Sector Performance Report, 2009 
 Note: a Exchange rate (US$1=GH¢ 0.91 in 2005), GNI per capita (US$467.7 in 2005): 
World Statistics Pocket book, UN Statistics Division, Website.  
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Table 2: Benefit incidence of public education expenditures, 2005 
 
    Quintile (%) Total 
  1 2 3 4 5   
Individual Quintiles       
Share of school-age population (3-23) 20.8 21.0 20.5 19.8 17.9 100 
Share of basic school-age population (6-14) 22.0 21.9 21.1 19.4 15.6 100 
Female share of sample 46.3 49.0 50.0 51.3 54.8 50.3 
Rural share of sample 91.0 83.6 69.5 51.8 27.3 64.6 
Share of household expenditure  5.1 10.1 15.1 22.6 47.1 100 
  Rate of participation  by individual quintiles      
Rate of participation for pre-school 46.3 61.5 68.5 67.7 41.9 57.2 
Rate of participation for primary school 79.0 95.8 88.7 91.3 70.3 85.0 
Rate of participation for JHS 45.7 57.5 62.0 63.9 53.7 56.6 
Rate of participation for SHS & TVET 21.8 21.2 17.8 30.5 46.5 27.6 
Rate of participation for post-secondary 0.5 0.8 2.4 3.0 6.9 2.7
                   Proportion of education subsidies received by individual quintiles 
Share of total education spending 14.8 17.5 19.4 22.0 26.3 100.0 
Share of pre-school spending 16.7 20.8 25.0 22.9 14.6 100.0 
Share of primary school spending 18.6 22.4 20.8 21.4 16.5 100.0 
Share of JHS spending 16.2 20.2 21.9 22.8 18.9 100.0 
Share of SHS (& TVET) spending  15.6 15.6 19.4 22.0 26.3 100.0 
Share of post-secondary spending 4.0 5.5 17.6 22.2 50.3 100.0 
Household Quintiles       
Share of school-age population (3-23) 25.5 24.0 20.0 17.3 13.2 100 
Share of basic school-age population (6-14) 26.6 24.2 20.7 16.7 11.8 100 
Share of total education spending  20.3 21.3 21.6 18.2 18.6 100 
Share of pre-school spending 31.3 27.1 20.7 14.6 6.3 100 
Share of primary school spending 29.7 27.6 21.6 13.8 7.3 100 
Share of JHS spending 22.8 25.0 23.2 18.9 10.1 100 
Share of SHS (& TVET) spending  9.8 17.0 20.9 27.5 24.8 100 
Share of post-secondary spending 4.5 7.4 20.8 19.7 47.6 100 
Source: Own estimations based on Table 1 and GLSS5 survey. Household are ranked by 
household expenditure per equivalent adults. 
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Table 3: GINI and concentration indices for use of public schooling 
 Estimate  Standard           Lower    Upper 
          error           bound    Bound 
Expenditure 0.417 0.002530 0.411985 0.421903 
Subsidy to Pre-school -0.197 0.006785 -0.209944 -0.183347 
Subsidy to Primary school -0.200 0.004296 -0.208410 -0.191567 
Subsidy to Junior high school -0.098 0.007084 -0.112023 -0.084251 
Subsidy to Senior high school 0.076 0.011161 0.054016 0.097767 
Subsidy to Tertiary  0.433 0.019458 0.394990 0.471267 
Source: Authors’ estimation based on GLSS 5 data. 
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Table 4: Dominance table for education services, standard method only 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1).  Pre-school   X D D D D D D D 
2). Primary School X  D D D D D D D 
3). Junior High School    X X D D D D 
4). 45-degree     D X D D D 
5). All education      D D D D 
6). Others*       D D D 
7). Senior High School        D D 
8). Expenditure         D 
9). Tertiary                   
Note: D indicates that the row dominates the column. X indicates that the curves crosses 
* includes teacher education and technical and vocational education 
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Table 5: Distribution of public education subsidies: 1989 –2005 
     % of benefits received    change in benefits 
     1989 1992 2005 1989-92 1992-05 1989-05 
Quintile   Primary            
1  21.2 21.8 18.4 0.6 -3.4 -2.8 
2  22.1 23.6 22.2 1.5 -1.4 0.1 
3  22.2 21.7 21.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.9 
4  20.3 18.8 21.5 -1.5 2.7 1.2 
5  14.3 14.0 16.3 -0.3 2.3 2.0 
total, of which 100 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   Accra  6.3 5.3 2.9 -1.0 -2.4 -3.4 
Other-urban  23.1 24.6 20.3 1.5 -4.3 -2.8 
Rural  70.6 70.1 76.8 -0.5 6.7 6.2 
Quintile   Secondary          
1  16.8 14.9 16.0 -1.9 1.1 -0.8 
2  18.0 21.8 18.3 3.8 -3.5 0.3 
3  21.8 21.1 18.3 -0.7 -2.8 -3.5 
4  23.4 23.5 22.5 0.1 -1.0 -0.9 
5  19.9 18.6 24.9 -1.3 6.3 5.0 
total, of which 100 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   Accra  11.1 12.0 8.9 0.9 -3.1 -2.2 
    Other-urban  23.3 30.1 30.9 6.8 0.8 7.6 
Rural  65.6 57.8 60.2 -7.8 2.4 -5.4 
Quintile   Tertiary      
1  7.7 6.0 4.0 -1.7 -2.0 -3.7 
2  3.8 9.5 5.5 5.7 -4.0 1.7 
3  19.2 19.0 17.6 -0.2 -1.4 -1.6 
4  19.2 20.2 22.2 1.0 2.0 3.0 
5  50.0 45.2 50.3 -4.8 5.1 0.3 
total, of which 100 100 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   Accra  42.3 27.4 27.1 -14.9 -0.3 -15.2 
     Other-urban  34.6 47.6 47.2 13.0 -0.4 12.6
Rural  23.1 25.0 25.6 1.9 0.6 2.5 
Quintile  All education   
1  17.1 16.4 14.8 -0.7 -1.6 -2.3 
2  17.0 20.7 17.5 3.7 -3.2 0.5 
3  21.4 21.0 19.4 -0.4 -1.6 -2.0 
4  20.8 21.1 22.0 0.3 0.9 1.2 
5  23.7 20.8 26.3 -2.9 5.5 2.6 
total, of which 100.0 100.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   Accra  15.6 11.6 10.0 -4.0 -1.6 -5.6 
     Other-urban  25.7 30.5 29.6 4.8 -0.9 3.9 
Rural   58.7 57.9 59.2 -0.8 1.3 0.5 
Note: 1989, 1992 (estimated by Demery et al., 1995), 2005 (author’s own estimations). 
1989 is ranked by household expenditure per capita, 1992 and 2005 are ranked by 
household expenditure per adults equivalent.  
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of regressors 
Variable Pre-school  Primary  Secondary 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Age of child 4.88 1.53 9.51 2.50 18.11 1.86 
Gender (female=1) 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Child of household head 0.81 0.39 0.77 0.42 0.67 0.47 
Years completed 0.00 0.00 3.73 1.89 1.97 0.74 
Household head’s years 6.44 7.65 7.23 8.28 8.42 9.07 
Household head's age 44.16 13.06 47.55 12.74 48.26 14.20 
Gender of head (female=1) 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 
Number of men 1.23 0.98 1.30 1.05 1.80 1.26 
Number of women 1.56 0.99 1.63 1.08 2.03 1.26 
Number of children 3.96 2.26 3.95 2.26 2.66 2.33 
Head works in formal sector 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.29 0.15 0.36 
Head works in informal sector 0.84 0.36 0.82 0.38 0.78 0.41 
Catholic  0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38 
Moslem  0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
Traditional religion 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 
Resides in Accra (GAMA) 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.32 
Resides in other urban 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.29 0.45 
Resides in Rural coastal 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24 
Resides in Rural forest 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.40 
Resides in Rural Savannah 0.41 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47 
Net income (GH¢ ‘000’) 1.79 1.59 2.01 1.20 2.34 2.64 
Travel time (hrs) 4.35 3.12 4.37 3.15 4.30 3.05 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on GLSS 5 surveys 
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Table 7: Nested Multinomial Logit estimates for choice of schooling.  
 Pre-school  Primary  Secondary 
VARIABLES Private Public  Private Public  Private Public 
Constant 2.61** 1.30  19.25*** 19.15***  -7.73** -7.87*** 
 (1.28) (1.22)  (2.59) (2.55)  (3.01) (3.01) 
Age 0.42*** 0.48***  0.95*** 0.91***  -0.76*** -0.76*** 
 (0.04) (0.03)  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.12) (0.12) 
Child of head 0.08 0.14  0.58*** 0.51***  0.36*** 0.35*** 
 (0.17) (0.12)  (0.11) (0.11)  (0.12) (0.12) 
Gender (female=1) 0.10 0.12  0.03 0.01  -0.42*** -0.43*** 
 (0.11) (0.08)  (0.09) (0.08)  (0.12) (0.12) 
Years completed    0.27*** 0.32***  1.75*** 1.77*** 
    (0.09) (0.09)  (0.14) (0.14) 
Head years 0.07*** 0.08***  0.06*** 0.06***  -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Head’s age -0.01 0.01*  -0.00 0.00  0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Female headed 0.60*** 0.81***  0.59*** 0.59***  -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.16) (0.13)  (0.13) (0.13)  (0.12) (0.12) 
Number of men -0.22*** -0.06  -0.07 -0.06  0.02 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Number of women -0.18** -0.04  0.05 0.05  0.06 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Number of children -0.26*** -0.02  -0.01 0.02  0.04 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) 
Head, informal    -0.22 -0.20  -0.47*** -0.47*** 
    (0.19) (0.19)  (0.17) (0.17) 
Traditional -3.70** -0.98***  -0.70*** -0.59***  -12.20*** 0.49 
 (1.67) (0.18)  (0.16) (0.14)  (3.40) (0.46) 
Accra (GAMA) 3.82*** 1.23***  0.93*** 0.55**  -0.87*** -0.92*** 
 (0.30) (0.31)  (0.35) (0.28)  (0.22) (0.22) 
Rural coastal 1.55*** 0.59***  0.28 0.29*  -0.67*** -0.67*** 
 (0.26) (0.16)  (0.18) (0.17)  (0.23) (0.23) 
Rural forest 1.58*** 0.91***  1.07*** 1.06***  -0.69*** -0.72*** 
 (0.22) (0.12)  (0.14) (0.14)  (0.19) (0.19) 
Log(Net expenditure) 5.50*** 5.50***  3.94*** 3.94***  3.24*** 3.24*** 
 (1.56) (1.56)  (1.35) (1.35)  (1.26) (1.26) 
σ 0.88*** 0.88***  0.26*** 0.26***  0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.24) (0.24)  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.02) (0.02) 
τ 15.28*** 15.28***  52.48*** 52.48***  7.06*** 7.06*** 
Loglikelihood -3062.69 -3062.69  -4628.60 -4628.60  -1666.99 -1666.99 
% correctly predicted 75.2 75.2  86.7 86.7  79.3 79.3 
Observations 4047 4047  8234 8234  2632 2632 
Base category is No-school, Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own Calculations based on GLSS 2005/06 
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Table 8: Price and income elasticity of education demand 
  Own price elasticity  Income elasticity 
  Preschool Primary Secondary  Preschool Primary Secondary
Private       
Poorest quintile  -0.043 -1.551 -4.149 0.048 0.124 0.125 
2 -0.022 -0.542 -1.345 0.035 0.089 0.101 
3 -0.016 -0.378 -0.917 0.031 0.076 0.093 
4 -0.012 -0.301 -0.646 0.028 0.065 0.086 
Richest quintile -0.009 -0.192 -0.393 0.024 0.048 0.082 
Public       
Poorest quintile  0.033 -0.147 -0.850 0.012 0.521 0.005 
2 -0.008 -0.096 -0.369 0.010 0.041 0.048 
3 -0.011 -0.123 -0.491 0.011 0.043 0.050 
4 -0.008 -0.131 -0.443 0.013 0.048 0.048 
Richest quintile -0.007 -0.124 -0.433  0.015 0.057 0.051 
Source: Own estimations based on Table 7. 
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Table 9:  Simulated probabilities by expenditure quintiles, and type of provider 
  Predicted probabilities  Change in probabilities 
  Pre-school Primary Senior  Pre-school Primary Senior 
Baseline probabilities 
None 0.4816 0.1983 0.7459 0.0 0.0 0.0 
      Private 0.1801 0.1773 0.043 0.0 0.0 0.0 
      Public 0.3383 0.6245 0.2135 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Price of public option is zero 
None 0.3663 0.1694 0.7065 -0.1153 -0.0289 -0.0394 
      Private 0.1184 0.0794 0.0088 -0.0617 -0.0979 -0.0342 
      Public 0.5153 0.7511 0.2848 0.1770 0.1266 0.0713 
Price of private option is zero 
None 0.3864 0.1721 0.7142 -0.0952 -0.0262 -0.0317 
      Private 0.4345 0.49 0.1352 0.2544 0.3127 0.0922 
      Public 0.1791 0.3378 0.1505 -0.1592 -0.2867 -0.063 
Moving everybody out of poorest quintile  
None 0.481 0.1975 0.741 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0049 
      Private 0.1964 0.1778 0.0452 0.0163 0.0005 0.0022 
      Public 0.3226 0.6247 0.2137 -0.0157 0.0002 0.0002 
Moving poor households to the poverty line 
None 0.4814 0.1977 0.7390 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0069 
      Private 0.1956 0.1777 0.0470 0.0155 0.0004 0.0040 
      Public 0.323 0.6246 0.2140  -0.0153 0.0001 0.0005 
Source: Own estimation based on Table 10 
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Table 10: Dominance Table for education services, various methods 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1. Pre-school, standard  D D X D D D D D 
2. Pre-school, uniform   D D D D D D D 
3. Pre-school, CV    D D D D D D 
4. Primary, standard X    D X D D D 
5. Primary, uniform      X D D D 
6. Primary, CV       D D D 
7. Secondary, standard        non-D non-D 
8. Secondary, uniform         non-D 
9. Secondary, CV          
Note: D indicates that the row dominates the column. X indicates that the curves cross, 
and ‘non-D’ indicates non dominance.  
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Table A1: Variables definition  
NETEXPEND (in million C) Household expenditure minus schooling cost 
Years completed Number of school years completed by the child 
Head Years Number of schooling years by child's father 
Number of men Number of men aged 18-60 years 
Number of women Number of men aged 18-60 years 
Number of Children Number of children aged< 15 years 
Female Dummy variable (= 1 if child is male, 0 if female) 
Child of head Dummy variable (= 1 if child of head, 0 otherwise) 
Other Child Dummy variable (= 1 if not child of, 0 other household member) 
Female headed Dummy variable (= 1 household head is female, 0 if male) 
Catholic Dummy variable (= 1 if child is a Catholic, 0 otherwise) 
Pentecostal Dummy variable (= 1 if child is a Pentecostal, 0 otherwise) 
Moslem Dummy variable (= 1 if child is a Moslem, 0 otherwise) 
Traditional Dummy variable (= 1 if child is a religion is traditional 0 otherwise) 
Accra (GAMA) Dummy variable (= 1 if child lives in Accra metropolis, 0 otherwise) 
Other urban Dummy variable (= 1 if child lives in other urban areas, 0 otherwise) 
Rural coastal Dummy variable (= 1 if child lives in rural coastal area, 0 otherwise) 
Rural forest Dummy variable (= 1 if child lives in rural forest area, 0 otherwise) 
Rural savanna Dummy variable (= 1 if child lives in rural savanna area, 0 otherwise) 
Head formal sector Dummy variable (= 1 if head works in a formal area, 0 otherwise) 
Head informal sector Dummy variable (= 1 if head works in a informal area, 0 otherwise) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-12
 31
Appendix A2: OLS Wage model 
Variables  Coefficient  T‐value 
Constant  11.2327  115.78 
Age  0.0198  8.22 
Age square  ‐0.0005  ‐10.09 
Married  0.2003  7.02 
Region/area of residence     
    Accra (GAMA)  0.9523  19.85 
    Other urban  0.6569  17.39 
    Rural coastal  0.3150  6.83 
    Rural forest  0.3058  7.93 
Relationship to head     
    Spouse of head  ‐0.3678  ‐12.31 
    Relatives  ‐0.4313  ‐6.08 
    Non relatives  ‐0.5935  ‐2.61 
Household composition     
    No. Of relatives in household  ‐0.0021  ‐0.20 
    No. Of non relatives in household   0.1414  2.88 
    Number of men in household  0.0966  7.37 
    Number  of women in household   ‐0.0079  ‐0.59 
    Number of children in household  0.0161  2.28 
Years of education     
    Primary graduate e  0.2837  9.86 
    Secondary graduate   0.6664  15.23 
    University/Polytechnic graduate  1.2764  13.72 
     Postgraduate  2.2534  11.62 
Father's education     
     Primary graduate  ‐0.0797  ‐1.24 
     Middle/Junior high graduate  0.0122  0.37 
     Secondary graduate  0.0983  1.32 
     Postsecondary graduate   0.2383  3.52 
Mother's education     
     Primary graduate  0.0065  0.10 
     Middle/Junior high graduate  ‐0.0616  ‐1.60 
     Secondary graduate  ‐0.0352  ‐0.36 
     Postsecondary graduate  0.0899  0.67 
Head's sector of employment     
     Formal  0.3082  5.03 
     Informal  0.0456  0.86 
Source: Own estimations based on GLSS 5 data. Note: N=9,796 observations. R2 = 0.235.  
Model estimated on all respondents older than 9 years who reported to have worked and 
received wages. The dependent variable is log wage.  
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Figure 2: Concentration Curves for Public schooling, 2005/06 
    
(a) Pre-school, 2005/06          (b) Primary schooling, 2005/06 
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          (c)  Junior high schooling, 2005/06                   (d) Senior high schooling, 2005/06 
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Source: Own estimation based on GLSS 5 survey 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
  
        (e) Tertiary schooling, 2005/2006      (f) All public schools, 2005/06 
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     (g) All public schools, 2005/06            (h) All public schools, 2005/06 
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Note: “Others” include teacher and vocational training. Tertiary includes universities and 
polytechnics; Post-secondary includes tertiary and teacher education. 
Source: Own estimation based on GLSS5 data 
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Figure 3: Concentration curves for CV, standard, and uniform methods, 2005/06 
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Source: Own estimation based on GLSS 5 survey 
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